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1. Introduction: Why undertake a pilot case study?  
 
 
 
This paper deals with the concept of ideational leadership (IL) and, more specifically, 
with the operationalization of this concept and its measurement in empirical data. Therefore, it 
is first and foremost intended as the presentation and discussion of a methodological approach 
that forms part of a doctoral thesis on the role of political actors in the achievement of 
structural reforms in welfare state arrangements. For the sake of brevity, I will restrict 
references to the rationale of this greater project and its theoretical grounding to a minimum 
(see section 2) and proceed to the presentation of the theoretical concept itself.  
IL is initially defined and presented as a combination of abilities (to be found mainly in 
argumentative patterns) of key reformist politicians aimed at convincing reform opponents of 
the need for path-breaking reform. Further, it is hypothesized that IL is a major factor 
enabling politicians to pushing through such reforms under conditions of institutional and 
political resistance.  
Using the path-breaking German pension reform of 2001 as an empirical illustration, the 
chapter outlines one possible way of making IL visible. In addition, I will also suggest ways 
to evaluate the effects of IL on reform resistance not only by trying to signal these effects but 
also by asking whether ‘alternative explanations’ of achieving path-breaking reform, i.e. 
outmanoeuvring reform opponents and making concessions in return for acquiescence may 
have played a role. The strategy followed to achieve this consists of triangulating two 
different sorts of analysis: On the one hand, it makes use of content analysis of selected 
documents showing argumentative patterns of key politicians in dealing with the reform. On 
the other, it relies on the analysis of a handful of expert interviews with ministry, party and 
interest group officials in order to complement the evidence about the occurrence of these 
various strategies. 
The goal of this dual methodology is not to arrive at an overall evaluation of the 
hypothesis about IL (i.e. to come to conclusions about its truthfulness), but to evaluate the 
plausibility and usefulness of the initial analytical framework consisting of IL as well as of 
alternative strategies in the context of a (single) pilot case study.  
 
A word about the sense and utility of pilot studies is in place here. Although more 
frequently used in large-scale quantitative studies involving surveys, I argue that pilot studies 
can also be fruitful in more qualitatively oriented case-study designs involving more than just 
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a handful cases. In his well-known work on the purposes of case studies, Eckstein uses the 
term plausibility probe to refer to what I call a pilot study. According to his line of work, 
‘plausibility probes involve attempts to determine whether potential validity may reasonably 
be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing’ (Eckstein 1975: 108). In 
the present study, the pilot is explicitly set up to evaluate the value of the existing theoretical 
framework, on this point Eckstein argues that ‘at a minimum, a plausibility probe into theory 
may simply attempt to establish that a theoretical construct is worth considering at all, i.e. that 
an apparent empirical instance of it can be found’ (Eckstein 1975: 110 ). Similarly, the 
authors of an acclaimed work on social science methodology state that  
 
‘…Pilot projects are often very useful, especially in research where data must be gathered by 
interviewing or other particularly costly means. Preliminary data gathering may lead us to alter 
the research questions or modify the theory of using the same data to generate and test a theory 
can be avoided.’ (King, Keohane et al. 1994: 22-23) 
 
Further to these more general goals of pilot studies the following list sums up the specific 
goals of this study:  
 Improving upon the initial operationalization of IL, starting from some initial dimensions 
 Getting familiar with relevant sources, this applies mostly to documents but also to 
knowledgeable interviewees 
 Designing and presenting methods of analysis that combine the informational value of 
both documents and interview data 
 Illustrating the effects of IL (i.e. stating arguments for a causal link between the 
occurrence of IL and path-breaking reforms) 
 
In short, the goals of this pilot case study are thus of a practical (regarding data collection), 
theoretical, and methodological nature and will be returned to in the conclusion. From these 
goals, the first one (improving the operationalization of the IL concept) is be the most 
important one theoretically-speaking, as the insights gained by focusing on the German 2001 
pension reform will be used to refine its dimensions. The ultimate purpose is, eventually, to 
come up with a hypothesis that is more plausible and useful to work with than the initial one 
(NB: this is not to be confused with exploring the validity of the hypothesis!) 
 This process is in line with a conception of social research where data or evidence on 
the one hand, and analytic frames, derived from ideas and theory on the other, inform each 
other (see chapter 3 in Ragin 1994). At any rate, the final result should be a workable 
theoretical framework that can be readily used in subsequent analyses of cases in different 
areas of social policy. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives some necessary theoretical background to 
the IL concept and its constituent dimensions as it based on previous work on the subject and 
the author’s own ideas. The following section presents an operationalization of these 
dimensions in terms of empirical indicators to be applied to documents and a summary of 
indicators guiding the organization of interviews. Then, Section 4 discusses the case choice 
case for the pilot and illustrates the steps followed in approaching the study of the 2001 
pension reform. In addition, it supplies background information for the reader to be able to 
place the subsequent analyses in context. The actual analysis of both document and interview 
material, using examples as illustrations of the indicators cited earlier, can be found in Section 
5. In a short discussion, the implications of the findings for the theoretical framework are 
outlined. Section 6 summarizes and concludes by considering the initial goals of the study.   
 
 
 
2. Theoretical background to the concept of ideational leadership (IL) 
Dimensions of IL:  the role of ‘puzzling’ and ‘powering’ in the context of welfare state reform   
 
The concept of ideational leadership (IL) is inspired by various concepts belonging to 
the literature on political ideas and leadership, indicating that it consists of more than one 
functional aspect: a) ‘reformist leadership’ made up of a communicative and a strategic, 
coalition-building dimension ('t Hart 2000), b) ‘innovative leadership’ and the attached 
importance of political will or commitment to reform (Moon 1995), c) the concept of 
‘political discourse’, based on arguments following both a ‘logic of necessity’ and a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’(Schmidt 2002a) d) ‘policy investment’ and how interest groups may be 
affected by policy-makers pursuing structural change (Jacobs 2002). 
IL implies that key policy-makers, defined as reform-minded members of the executive 
branch with the authority to launch policy proposals, are able to leave a significant imprint on 
political outcomes. In the specific context of welfare state reform, dominant institutional 
theories (Esping-Andersen 1996; Pierson 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999) have identified 
important institutional and electoral barriers to structural reforms, which can also be labelled 
as ‘reform resistance’. I assume that under certain conditions, IL can transform such 
resistance into acceptance of or at least neutral behaviour, towards reform initiatives1. 
                                                 
1 That such acceptance may not come ‘for free’ is not of concern here; possibly policy-makers may be forced to 
make concessions to reform opponents on other matters than the reform issue at hand. 
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What are the dimensions of IL, or, in other words, what kind of behaviour makes key 
policy-makers more likely to push through structural reforms?  Initially, the following three 
(four?) dimensions have been identified, based on above-mentioned concepts and the author’s 
own ideas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reformist policy-makers are more likely to succeed with structural reform when    
1) Exposing the drawbacks of old policy principles underlying the status quo  
2) Making consistent efforts to legitimise ‘new’ benchmarks 
3) Confronting reform opponents by framing their resistance as ‘problematic’ for a) societal 
welfare and b) the bargaining position of interest groups and the long-term welfare of their 
constituencies 
4) Anticipating bureaucratic bottlenecks through early consultation with implementing 
agencies 
 
Illustration 1. The hypothesis of ideational leadership (IL) and its dimensions  
 
In terms of how many of these dimensions have to be represented in the data in order to be 
able to claim an instance of IL, the following applies:  
The presence of evidence belonging to dimensions 1) and 2) is considered necessary to speak 
of IL at all, we could then speaking of IL with an emphasis on ‘puzzling’ or ‘the ideational’ in 
IL. If complemented by arguments of type 3) one could speak of IL with an emphasis not only 
on ‘puzzling’, but rather on ‘powering within puzzling’2. Evidence for 4) even adds an 
emphasis on pre-emptive support building, which can be seen as an instance of ‘powering’; in 
this case we can speak of IL with both an ideational and political element.  
As ‘the ideational’ is seen as the essential part of IL, the logical consequence of is to conclude 
that if no evidence can be found for dimensions 1) and 2), it is impossible to speak of IL at all: 
pointing out the wrongs of the status quo and the introduction of innovative solutions based 
on new policy ideas is considered a crucial element of IL. In the case evidence of 3) and 4) 
turns up, we may speak of leadership that engages with the problem of resistance and engages 
in coalition-building, but this leadership is considered purely political and not ideational.  
                                                 
2 On the origins of these two concepts see Heclo, H. (1974). Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From 
relief to income maintenance. New Haven, Yale University Press. ‘Puzzling’ here refers to changing the 
cognitive and normative preferences of (opposed) actors. ‘Powering with puzzling’ refers to changing, by way of 
argument, how these actors perceive their own interests. ‘Powering’, on the other hand, refers to behaviour that 
maintains or even enhances one’s own position in terms of authority and power vis-à-vis potential or real 
opponents. 
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 The next step is to ask how dimensions 1 through 4 have been operationalized so far and 
whether this operationalization will serve us well once it is confronted with empirical data. 
The latter question can obviously be answered only after pre-screening the data with the help 
of the defined categories and indicators and, more importantly, performing a preliminary 
analysis using these (Berelson 1971). An overview of the operationalization of the dimensions 
can be found in section 1 of the appendix.   
 
 
3. Case selection and methodology 
 
The German 2001 pension reforms case, described by some as a ‘recognized 
achievement of structural reform’ (Meurer 2001) has been chosen as the empirical base for 
the pilot case. In the literature on welfare state politics and change, this reform project has 
received notable attention of late (Hinrichs 2003; Hinrichs and Kangas 2003; Lamping and 
Rueb 2004). In the following I am going to briefly introduce the reform proposals and 
characterize the process of reform, including the policy positions of the major actors 
involved.  
The 2001 pension reforms in Germany came about after nearly two years of frequently 
changed reform proposals and extensive talks between the government and the opposition on 
the one hand, and interest groups, especially trade unions, on the other. The actual 
parliamentary process took half a year to be completed for the most controversial bill of the 
three that constituted the core of the reforms. The two major pieces of legislation that 
emerged from this period were the Old-Age Provision Act and the Old-Age Provision 
Extension Act. The first, containing the provisions establishing a new private pension tier, in 
addition to the existing public scheme, was passed in May 2001 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 29 June 
2001). The second, including the legal provisions for benefit cutbacks in the public pension 
scheme, was passed in January 2001 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 26 March 2001). Yet another 
change, the reform of reduced capacity and disability pensions had already been passed as a 
separate law in December 2000 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 23 December 2000)  
The pilot case study will concentrate on the first two laws. What is the essence of these 
pension reforms? The main outcome is certainly the creation of a new private pension tier 
which is voluntary, sizable, and tax-subsidized. In this newly created private scheme, 
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occupational pensions are favoured over individual pensions. The introduction of a private 
pension tier is combined with benefit cutbacks in the public pension scheme which are 
substantial, yet not radical. Moreover, contribution rates are set to be stabilized in the long-
term at a level just above the year 2000 level. Both the creation of the private pension tier and 
the corrections in the public scheme reflect a long series of compromises since the original 
reform proposals went much further.  
At least four major corrections have been made in the course of the reform debate, 
either before or during the deliberations in parliament. First, the original plan of Social 
Democrat labour minister Riester provided for a mandatory private pension tier. Obliging 
German to invest into private pensions plans was meant to take off some of the financial and 
demographic pressure on the state-administered pension system in order to make it viable for 
the future. However, the mandatory element of the plan had to be withdrawn in reaction to 
massive protests of parties, interest groups and the public. Yet, even against a voluntary 
scheme there was considerable opposition both by leftist hardliners in the minister’s own 
party, the Social Democrats, and by some trade unions who distrusted investments in capital 
markets as a base for pension provision and feared too high financial obligations for low-
wage earners.   
Second, the size of the private pension tier turned out to be greater than originally designed. 
While contributions were first amounting to 2.5 percent of gross income to be gradually 
phased in until 2007, the law included the provision of 4 percent of gross income to be 
reached by 2008. The greatest driving force behind this upsizing was the decision of the 
government to agree to cutbacks of the public pension level, apparently under pressure from 
the opposition Christian Democrats. These cutbacks had to be compensated, however, by 
corresponding increases in private provision given the previous commitment of the Social 
Democrats to hold on to a combined pension level of 70 percent. The third major change 
concerned the extent to which the state would help individuals to finance the new private 
pension contributions. During the course of the extra-parliamentary government-opposition 
talks and several rounds of ‘bidding’, the envisaged modest support for citizens with low-
incomes was finally extended in the form of tax credits for middle and higher incomes as 
well, and earmarked as an amount of EURO 10 billion annually to be extended up to 20 
billion in 2008. Finally, the role of collectively negotiated occupational pension schemes was 
strengthened vis-à-vis individual pension plans. As a result of mainly trade union pressure 
pushing for an contribution of employers to employees private pension savings, a 
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compromise was reached which stipulated that collectively negotiated occupational pensions 
take precedence over individual pension plans. 
This short summary shows, on the one hand, how the reform is exemplary for how an 
originally ambitious project may lose its most far-reaching features over a drawn-out process 
of public debate and parliamentary decision-making. On the other, what remained of the 
original proposal is often described as a genuine structural reform that has changed the 
orientation of ‘path’ of German pension policy, despite the concessions made in the process.  
The intention and effective break-up of the traditional one-pillar pension provision makes the 
Riester-reform qualify as a structural reform, as it clearly envisaged to alter the financial and 
benefit structure of old-age pension provision in Germany. It follows that it fulfils the criteria 
for being a pilot case in my project, which focuses on instances of structural reforms rather 
than piecemeal or incremental reforms that leave the structural features of a policy intact. A 
second and more pragmatic reason is that the decision-making process took place fairly 
recently (2000-2001), implying that access to data - often available via online sources - is 
easier compared to cases from the early 1990s and, accordingly, requires less time 
investment.  
 
The following table (intended as a heuristic device) illustrates some preparatory steps in 
approaching the pilot in terms of the chronological order of organising the data collection and 
analysis. The list of steps serves to give an impression what the pilot case approach actually 
entails in terms of data collection and analysis, but does not include any detailed explanation of 
methods of analysis in the stricter sense of the word, i.e. the procedures followed to guide and 
conduct the actual analysis of the material collected. Below, I proceed to a short overview of 
data sources and the methods used to analyse them.  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Preparation and Data Collection 
Step1   Selecting a time frame of the reform process for the analysis 
Step2   Getting an overall picture of the main actors in the reform process and their 
initial policy positions 
Step3   Selecting a mix of documents 
Step4   Selecting interviewees and conduct pilot interviews 
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 Analysis 
Step5   Performing text analysis using developed categories and indicators 
Step6   Comparing and contrasting interview accounts using an analytic grid 
Step7   Evaluating plausibility of alternative explanations with the help of both sources 
Step8   Checking for contextual conditions of IL using background knowledge (relating 
to the policy area), documents and interview sources 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
.  
 
As for documents, I aimed to work with textual sources that would most likely contain 
arguments about the necessity and appropriateness of reforms. Here, texts that reformists 
themselves have produced and first and foremost by the minister himself seems a most logical 
choice. I worked with a selection of available speeches (both in a parliamentary context and 
outside of it), interviews, and opinion pieces in newspapers and journals as well as a semi-
biographical account written by labour minister Riester himself. I am not claiming here that 
these materials are comparable in all respects, since they vary considerably in length, 
audience and purpose. Yet I argue that looking at materials written for different contexts and 
at different times during the reform process will yield a good representation of reformists’ 
approach to justifying and legitimising reform proposals vis-à-vis both in the political arena 
and vis-à-vis the public.  
The analytical method performed on these documents is relatively straightforward and 
can be considered a qualitative content analysis (NB: in a second round of analysis still to be 
performed, frequency counts of key words defined per category using WinMax software, this 
will be done once all texts are converted into a machine-readable format). In a first reading of 
all texts, they were first pre-structured according to elements and then the elements containing 
information about the pension reform in a strict sense were coded according to the indicators 
belonging to the different categories derived from the conceptual dimensions. In this fashion,   
sentences or longer sections of text were classified according to the occurrence of categories 
in them. 
 
As for interviews, the data collected for the pilot are based on nine interviews in total 
(eight of which were conducted in person and one via e-mail) of ministry, party and interest 
group officials, and one policy expert, all of who were professionally involved in the reform 
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process. The interviews were half-structured and based on a topic list covering the following 
issues: interviewees’ perceptions concerning the process in general, the main actors in favour 
and against the reform, the strategies followed by those who advocated the reform, and factors 
that may have worked in favour of eventual reform adoption. Questions were phrased on the 
spot based on the topics and, where necessary, followed up by probing questions (see the 
appendix for an overview of the most important topic in the interview schedule).  
 
 
 
5. Analysis and Discussion  
 
5.1. A first analysis of document data 
 
Beginning with press interviews, this type of document revealed relatively little 
evidence as to the text-analytic categories, which is also due to the format that allows little 
room for well-developed patterns of argumentation. On the other hand, this may also be due 
to the fact that the materials analysed date back to 2000/2001, when the general ‘if’ of the 
reforms was no longer the object of discussion, but tiny details concerning technical changes 
to the bill. Questions posed in press interviews accordingly tended to probe the minister about 
such details and his chances for political success in the parliamentary process.  
Yet the minister, at least in one elaborate interview (23.10.00), does take the 
opportunity to reiterate the overarching goals of ‘generational justice’ and ‘stable contribution 
rates with an acceptable level of provision’ in the long term in reaction to the problems 
troubling the status-quo of pension provision (1st/2nd cat). He also hints at ‘false’ promises 
made in the past about ‘securing the standard of living’ by the state-administered system and 
that the requirements in terms of length of contributions are today at best ‘fictive’ (1st cat) and 
explains the need to carefully decrease pension levels in the long-run by the competing goal 
of having to keep contribution rates and the state subsidy to the pension budget under control 
(2nd cat). Asked how to deal with the resistance of the parliamentary opposition on which he 
depended to pass the bill in the CDU-dominated second chamber, the Bundesrat, he points to 
their severe credibility problem of the CDU if they dared to veto the tax credit to citizens for 
private pension provision. The background is that the governments funding plans by far 
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exceed what the CDU had requested themselves, indicating this would contradict their earlier 
arguments and, subsequently, their own interests (3rd cat.).  
 
The type of documents best suited to the kind of analysis chosen here, proved to be 
opinion articles where argumentative patterns justifying reforms can be most likely expected. 
Riester (ifo-Schnelldienst 28/29 2000) stresses the need to propose solutions for anticipated 
failure of the current system of pension provision within a decade or so (1st cat), also going 
into a rather systematic diagnosis of the necessities for structural reform (related to 
demography, level of non-wage labour costs and the systems general economic and budgetary 
significance). New goals and principles are then introduced with cognitive, normative and 
sometimes mixed meaning/significance (2nd cat). These include ‘a fair, just adjustment 
between generations’, ‘long-term stabilisation of old-age provision in order to reassure the 
elderly’, ‘modernizing old-age pension provision by constructing a fully-funded pillar of 
private pensions’, ‘preventing “bashful” poverty among the elderly’ and several innovations 
improving the situation concerning widowers pensions and the pension rights of women with 
children. New policy instruments and their underlying ideas are explained in relation to 
expected policy effects (thus linking solutions and problems as captured in the 1st/2nd cat.), 
regarding for example, a new calculation formula for pensions or the controversial 
compensation factor that is meant to decrease pension levels slightly in order to accommodate 
the setting-in of demographic effects. In an article of very similar content, directed to a trade 
union clientele (Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 10/2000), rather than pointing to the failure 
of the current state-run system, the minister stresses the (growing) lack of confidence in the 
state-run system - due to a long period of  ‘procrastination and belittlement of problems’ – 
rather than the inherent failure of the system itself. This is a theme running through most of 
the articles, but which is formulated differently accordingly to the audience of the text.  
The same topic comes back in an earlier text from spring 2000 (at a time where the 
minister was still involved in consensus talks with the opposition from the CDU/FDP which 
later broke down). In an article in the Frankfurter Rundschau (13.03.2000) Riester cites 
‘political forces that argue that the state-run system would not be able to resist demographic 
change in the future and plead for a tax-financed basic pension instead’. He makes clear that 
‘a fundamental decision needs to be made on whether the state-run system should be kept to 
ensure living standards or whether it should merely serve to avoid poverty’. However, he 
leaves not doubt about the government’s position, which sees a tax-financed basic pension as 
no alternative to the current PAYGO system, and the latter will ‘continue to form the main 
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pillar of old-age provision’. Yet, he repeats his case for careful, managed reform: due to 
demographic developments, technological progress and resulting changes in working 
conditions and a change of values in society, the same ‘state-run systems has to react to these 
changes if it is supposed to endure’. Especially the implication of these changes for the 
systems’ financial sustainability is explained in detail (1st cat.).  
In a last piece to be mentioned here, published during the later stages of a tedious, long-
drawn parliamentary process (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 25.4.01), Riester seems to try 
to remind the audience of the fundamentals of the reform, despite the daily fight about nitty-
gritty details in the political arena. Drawing exclusively on the ‘non-controversial’ 
demographic argument, he reminds us that ‘whatever the quality of a old-age pension system, 
none can deal with the dual threat of increasing life expectation and decreasing birth rates and 
thus a rising number of beneficiaries and a declining number of contributors’ (1st cat). He 
shows himself confident that the triple goals of ‘securing a provision level for pensioners’, 
‘creating predictability’ and ‘regain trust in the state-run system’ can be reached with his 
reform proposals (2nd cat). Especially, the tax-credit scheme is supposed to lead to a situation 
where pensioners will reach a level of provision that is ‘permanently higher than the current 
level of provision in the state-run system’ (2nd cat.). All in all, the reform is supposed to help 
to dissolve ‘Reformstau’ in the country by making pensions ‘sustainable’ (zukunftsfest) for the 
older generation and affordable (bezahlbar) for the younger generation. 
 
Finally, the last group of documents to which the analysis was applied were speeches of 
the minister both to his own party, the Social Democrats, and to parliament (Bundestag and 
Bundesrat) as audiences, ranging from November 1999 to Mai 2001.  
The speech to the SPD party congress on the future of social security (19.11.99), at a 
point in time where the initial core principles of the reform had been discussed publicly 
already, is first and foremost an attempt to justify the initial goals and principles of the reform 
which is presented as ‘the largest social policy project in the next couple of months’. Riester 
reiterates (and briefly explains) the goals of the reform: ‘generational contract’, ‘security of 
the pension system’, ‘low contribution rates’, ‘stable pension levels’ and, ‘additional (private) 
pension provision’. He presents these as a direct consequence of the party top’s ‘Leitantrag’ 
(programmatic statement to be put to the members) that stresses ‘a balance between individual 
responsibility and state benefits’ (2nd cat.) Strikingly, even at this early point in the reform 
process, he sharply attacks the line of the opposition on social policy issues as ‘populist, 
lacking concepts and untrustworthy’. While this is partially due to party congress rhetoric, 
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speeches in the context of the parliamentary process are qualitatively different, often striking 
up a much more serious tone, also towards the opposition on whose cooperation the ministers 
ultimately depends in the second chamber, the Bundesrat, at least for part of the proposals3.  
A summary of the three speeches held during the various readings and the final vote on 
the second and most controversial part of the bill shows that most time is spent in outlining 
and explaining the goals and main elements of the proposals. The initial speech then stresses 
‘balance between generations, ‘solidarity with gains’ and ‘security and affordability’ (2nd 
cat.) In the concluding part, the minister stresses the ‘many winners’ of the reform and 
concludes, perhaps too optimistically with the benefit of hindsight, that this reform is more 
than overdue and a necessary repair of the system, ‘a forward-looking reform for many 
decades, combining the principle of solidarity with individual responsibility’. The speech 
given at the second reading similarly reiterates the goals initially formulated and embedded in 
the revised proposal as well as dealing with the party-political tactics of the opposition, 
especially the Christian Democrats. Against the background of a doubtful advertising 
campaign against the government’s pension plans, he attacked the Christian Democrats 
agitating behaviour and populist turns in extra-parliamentary negotiations with the Social 
Democrats, accusing them of defaming people instead of using reasoned argumentation. The 
speech at the third and final reading drew up a balance of the improvements contained in the 
final bill concerning women, people with ill-health and disabled, additional private pension 
provision promoted by generous tax-credits. The latter point is even hailed as a ‘quantum 
leap’ in pension provision, linking solidarity with gains for everyone. Again, the behaviour of 
the opposition is taken up, however a careful distinction is being made between the 
‘constructive cooperation’ of the Liberal Democrats and the ‘blockades, procrastination and 
defamation’ on the side of the Christian Democrats. Yet, such rhetoric subtly highlights the 
end of pension reforms ‘under conditions of cross-party consensus’ that has allegedly been 
dominating German pension policy-making for many decades (Schludi 2002)      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This reflects the split of the original proposal into a law that contains changes to the state-run system and does 
not need Bundesrat approval and a second one covering the additional privately-financed pillar that does need 
Bundesrat approval.  
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5.1.2 Implications of the analysis for the theoretical framework  
 
Having presented an overview of the material, we now need to ask what was striking about 
these texts in terms of the concept of ideational leadership and its operationalization. Several 
points can be raised here.   
First, the theory on reformist or innovative leadership and on policy learning (and 
failure) would predict that politicians break radically with old institutions (see 1st category), 
pointing to the ineffectiveness of the status-quo. Yet his material on the German case 
illustrates that the minister refers to old institutions in careful, almost respectful terms (this 
may be due to a political context where discrediting ‘long-serving’ institutions is not easily 
done, and to the characteristics of a PAYGO system which has created powerful legal rights 
based on contributions). This observation is reminiscent of ‘t Hart’s conception of ‘conserving 
leadership’ ('t Hart and ten Hooven 2004).  It suggests that the indicators for the first 
dimension of IL (‘exposing the ills of the status quo’) needs to be adapted accordingly, i.e. 
that the underlying principles of the status-quo may not be rejected completely but be 
complemented by new principles when deemed necessary by key reformists. This does not 
necessarily change the core of the dimension, i.e. pointing out the ills of the status-quo.  
Second and related to the first point, old principles are, in the present case, not 
discarded completely as they are still seen valuable in itself but no longer sufficient to deal 
with current demographic and economic circumstances; yet they need to be complemented by 
new ones (see Riester’s motto ‘Solidarität mit Gewinn’): this point needs to be taken up in 
the operationalization of the 2nd dimension/analytical category. 
Third, it is striking that the various documents show relatively few arguments (except 
perhaps for the parliamentary speeches) regarding reformists’ dealings with reform 
resistance, which makes it difficult to judge upon the usefulness of the detailed theoretical 
distinction made in the 3rd dimension/category. The reason could be either that the documents 
selected are not a suitable source for this type of information or that the category as a whole 
is not particularly helpful for measuring ideational leadership at all. The interview schedule 
did not contain this point as a topic and therefore interview material cannot answer this 
question either.  
Fourth, in terms of relative location of justification and legitimisation of reforms in the 
texts (NB: Would it make sense to come up with descriptive statistics for this and as well for 
the space taken up in relation to the total length of the texts?), arguments that fit into the pre-
formulated categories appeared to be concentrated in introductory parts of articles and 
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speeches as well as in close proximity to the explanation of policy goals and instruments. 
Also, frequently 1st/2nd category arguments were found clustering together, supporting the 
claim that arguments rejecting elements of the old order and introducing new ones tend to be 
used together.   
 
In sum, these observations warrant adjusting the existing dimensions 3 (and analytical 
categories) 1, 2 and 3 of IL, however, they do not suggest additional ones. Coming to the 
judgement about whether these texts support the hypothesis that the behaviour of Minister 
Riester fits the properties of IL as defined in Section 2, the answer is positive. We can state 
that most longer opinion pieces showed a purposeful structure including the necessity of 
reform linked to existing and expected policy problems, an exposition of the total concept 
and its goals including instruments and their expected effects on the problems. In his 
speeches, the pattern was similar, with slight variations depending on context and audience, 
and even some interviews showed the type of argumentation assumed to indicate IL. Judging 
from these documents alone, the empirical material indicates a rather purposeful 
communication of reform necessity and appropriateness.  
Yet we need to keep in mind that an analysis of the content of communication does not 
tell us anything about the reception yet (see different content analysis research designs in 
Holsti 1969). In other words, whether this purposeful communication, agreement with the 
dimensions of IL, had also an influence on the achievement of the reform cannot be 
ascertained from the texts alone. Let us now turn to the empirical data gained through expert 
interviews.  
 
5.2. A first analysis of interview data 
 
In the analysis of the data from the interview accounts, the two key questions in term of 
theoretical substance and method are:  
What is striking about the accounts of interviewees, are there general patterns in the answers 
that call our attention? What do the answers suggest about the suitability of the topic list and 
the need to refine the wording of the questions yet further? 
 
The following points sum up some observations made after repeated comparison of the 
material and suggest adaptations of theoretical framework and/or the topic list/interview 
schedule respectively.  
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First, in contrast to the initial assumption about the fundamental controversy of this (or 
any!) structural reform proposal, a majority of the interview partners stated that the ‘IF’ of 
the reform was not controversial, but the ‘HOW’. One could falsely infer that the reform 
process was facilitated by this minimum consensus on that radical reform was needed. Yet, 
the ‘HOW’ did arouse enough controversy and resistance in itself, causing the initial 
proposal to be altered substantially against the wishes of the minister (upgrading of company-
sponsored pension schemes vs. voluntary private pension arrangements). Yet this is not 
consequential for the IL hypothesis in itself, as it does not specify whether the resistance to 
be overcome is fundamental (against radical reform in any form) or tendential (against a 
particular reform plan). 
    Second, the analytical distinction made between reform backers and reform critics 
was perceived as somewhat confusing (and to one person it even seemed outright wrong!): 
perhaps the interview schedule could make a further distinction between reform critics (those 
who oppose reform on fundamental grounds or on the basis of instruments or technical 
details) 
Third, most interviews made clear that there is not necessarily a link between 
communicative skills and leadership as the qualities of the minister in this respect were 
divergent, one interviewee even commended the minister on his communication and 
‘conveying skills’ (with notable exceptions such as his planned absence during a key public 
hearing in parliament). However, the same interviewee would give him a bad score on 
political leadership, which is also said to include judgements of the strength of political 
enemies and trying to get opponents of his own party on board by involving them timely. 
This is an important point suggesting that a certain awareness of power relations and skill to 
make use of them helps to anticipate political difficulties later, possibly heightening the 
chances of reform success.  This point also suggests that communicative and ‘ideational 
skills’ on the one hand and political leadership, defined as taking into account power 
relations and taking seriously ‘pockets of resistance’ on the other are not always correlated 
Yet it is interesting in theoretical terms to see whether IL involves more often than not the 
ability of key politicians to managed power relations by building coalitions backing reform 
plans. This implies add a ‘powering’ dimension to the conceptualisation of IL taking this 
point into account.  
Fourth, regarding the usage of different strategies that were explicitly inquired about in 
the interviews, more often than not all three strategies were confirmed to have been used 
during the reform process. Sometimes the strategy of ignoring/outmanoeuvring opponents 
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(operationalizing the alternative explanation ‘changing the rules of the game’) was not named 
or even denied, in other account it was interpreted as ‘trying to involve the opposition as a 
weapon against opponents in the own party’, as a result, the second alternative explanation  
‘changing the rules of the game’ is in need of some reformulation to make it more precise 
both in theoretical terms and for future interviews.  
Fifth, the eventual acceptance of the proposal was interpreted as the consequence of a 
mixture of factors: reformers’ concessions, realization of the avoidance of even more radical 
change, economic restraints, reform tiredness, integration of opponents. The trade unions as 
most important societal opponents of the reform plans, also hinted to a sort of  ‘resignation to 
the facts’, furthermore, several answers showed that the term ‘acceptance’ was not 
sufficiently clear in the question, thus the wording needs to be improved both in theoretical 
terms and in the interview schedule.  
Finally, a list of helpful factors can be derived from the interview accounts yielding 
potential enabling conditions for IL to lead to reform success. Answers included the new 
economy boom, the maturation of the debate on demographic change, retrenchment pressures 
(and globalisation arguments), media reporting favourable to reforms, change of the pension 
debate from an expert to a public, financial industry and academic lobbying, the relative 
progressiveness of the Green party in the governing Red-Green coalition, Germany’s 
backward position in terms of modernizing its pension arrangements. The open question 
posed to the interviewees at the end brought up additional factors that may be considered as 
complementing the latter information on helpful factors: influence of the VDR (the central 
organisation of pension insurance bodies) on the policy process, hampering influence of 
federalism, internal dynamics of governing coalition  
 
  
5.3. Discussion of combined results  
 
This section should be understood as an attempt to combine and interpret the results 
taken from the previous textual and interview analysis, i.e. methodologically speaking 
triangulating them. At this point, it is useful to recall the initial questions of both analyses: 
how can we measure ideational leadership (and, to some degree, also its effects on reform 
resistance) and what does the process of collecting and analysing data in this pilot case 
suggest for refining the theoretical framework and methods used in the same process?  
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Our exercise in textual analysis has shown that it is indeed possible, to a certain degree, 
to detect and record pre-defined categories reflecting dimensions of the rather abstract 
concept of ideational leadership. The method, while still rather coarse and perhaps lacking in 
terms of validity and reliability because of the vagueness of its indicators (‘arguments 
showing….’ rather than using content analytical categories containing fixed entries) has 
nevertheless proved practicable to detect general patterns of justification in opinion texts, 
speeches and interviews (to a lesser extent in this last category as mentioned above).  
In terms of the usefulness of the analytical categories the results imply that the 1st and 
2nd category (relating to the ideational mechanism triggered by IL) that have been found 
across various texts may be taken over into the final research design with minor changes. 
Judging upon the 3rd category (framing reform resistance as problematic) is more complicated 
as reformists’ statements about the behaviour of reform opponents seem to occur less 
frequently and if they do, they can be found in records of direct confrontations with  the 
parliamentary opposition, denouncing them for playing sleazy tactical games. The question to 
be raised whether it is justified to keep this aspect as a dimension of ideational leadership. The 
fourth category, representing the 4th dimension of IL, is being dropped since textual analysis 
cannot serve to detect this type of data.  
 
While textual analysis has thus helped to come to judgements about that key reformists 
showed certain theorized efforts at communication during the reform process that conform to 
the characteristics of ideational leadership, much more information about the reform process 
in general and to a certain extent on the reception of this communication, could be gained 
through obtaining interview data. I am stressing again here, that the purpose of the interviews 
was to gather a wide as possible range of different perceptions about the reform process and 
not to reconstruct exactly what happened in the process (for such an endeavour, hundreds of 
interviewees would be needed!). From the perspectives of these informants, nevertheless a 
picture has emerged that allows me to place the results from the textual analysis into a greater 
context and see them in a different light.  
Ideational leadership of the minister, when solely defined as skilful communication and 
consistent efforts to inform about and justify reforms by argumentation has been 
acknowledged by a majority of interviewees. Yet many of them pointed to ‘difficulties’ 
caused by the minister’s leadership style in other respects, especially where communication 
with the SPD parliamentary party and their junior coalition partner is concerned. Little 
sensitivity to reform opponents and their potential and actual influence on the reform process 
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as well as the problems with developing a far-reaching reform project almost completely 
within the confines of a ministry before going public perhaps do not merely reflect a strategic 
choice, but also a lack of confidence in one’s political leadership capabilities. This 
information  points to the need to formulate a fourth dimension of IL that takes into account a 
key politicians awareness of and sensitivity to power relations in the political arena, i.e. 
efforts at political coalition-building.  
Combining the observations made so far in this section lead to the following renewed  
conceptualisation of IL:  
 
Dimensions of Ideational leadership 1-4 
 1) Exposing  
drawbacks of old 
policy principles 
underlying the status 
quo  
 
2) Making consistent 
efforts to legitimise 
‘new’ benchmarks, 
possibly alongside 
old ones 
 
3) Engaging with 
reform opponents by 
framing resistance as 
‘problematic’ for 
‘societal welfare’  
 
4) Making efforts at 
political coalition-
building 
IL Type 1 X X   
IL Type 2 X X X  
IL Type 3 X X X X 
No IL, but strict 
political 
leadership 
   
(X) 
 
X 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2: Revised concept of IL and its dimensions 
Note:   
• Dimensions 1+2 are considered to be necessary and sufficient conditions of IL 
• Adding dimensions 3 and/or 4 changes the quality of IL, leading to different types (2 and 3).  
• If only dimension 4 or both 4 and 3 are present, we can speak of political leadership yet not of 
ideational leadership 
 
 
5.4. Towards an evaluation of IL versus alternative explanations  
 
The interviews have also revealed perceptions on strategies used in the reform process in 
general. One important observation has been that, rather than being mutually exclusive, as the 
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term ‘alternative explanations’ implies to some readers, these can be concurrent (7 out of 9 
interviewees found that all of the three strategies were used). This is important to keep in 
mind when proceeding to other cases studies (at this point it cannot be established whether 
this observation is be specific to the German 2001 pension reform or not).  
At any rate, in order to come to a balanced argument on the relative influence of these 
strategies, one would need to compare the evidence for their usage by political actors from 
document and interview sources, backing this up with evidence from other sources if 
available (e.g. academic analyses/press coverage). In an alternative research design, one 
would have to collect enough ‘substantive’ information on the (relative) presence or absence 
of these strategies (through the sources just mentioned) and use qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) or fuzzy-set analysis (Ragin 1987; Ragin 2000) to come to statements about 
the relative importance of these strategies; that would imply treating them from the outset as 
complementary factors causing the outcome of a successful reform.4
 
One, if not the major difficulty of gauging effects of IL lies in the fact that it is difficult 
to pinpoint instances of leadership, for instance important decisions taken by a key politician 
during the reform process, which may be followed by immediate reactions of reform 
opponents showing them to change their behaviour/interests which again translates into some 
sort of approval/acknowledgement/acceptance of what reformers have said. If this process 
does occur, it is likely to occur with (perhaps considerable) delay, which again makes it 
difficult to detect effects across different groups of reform opponents, because their reactions 
would have to be observed during a long period of time.  
   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has demonstrated the purposes of a pilot case study by taking the case of the 
German pension reform 2001 as an illustrative example. To this end, the substantive results of 
a textual analysis of documents, an analysis of interview data, and a synthesis of the two have 
                                                 
4 This would imply looking at reform process cases in terms of configurations, where strategies to achieve 
reform acceptance are treated as ‘causal conditions’. QCA and fuzzy-set methodologies could serve to establish 
what configurations of strategies (implying they can be absent, partially present or fully present) would be 
necessary and/or sufficient to for reform success (or conversely: failure) to occur. On recent developments 
regarding QCA and fuzzy-sets see www.compasss.org.    
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been presented. As stated in the introduction, the paper started out with four goals of a 
practical, theoretical and methodological nature, reflecting the goals of the pilot study itself. 
To what extent have these four goals been achieved? Let us consider them one by one.  
 
Improving upon the initial operationalization of IL 
Both the analysis of textual and interview data have revealed that the initial dimensions of 
ideational leadership need some fine-tuning, this was found true for dimensions 1-3, to this 
end the points listed in the section on analysis have to be taken up in the theoretical 
framework. In addition, a coalition-building dimension has been taken up to accommodate the 
notion of a key politician ‘being aware of political power relations’. 
 
Getting familiar with relevant sources, this applies mostly to documents but also to 
knowledgeable interviewees 
 
This goal has been achieved in the process of conducting the pilot. Ways to locate and select 
suitable documents have been explored and experience with selecting and approaching 
interviewees and inquiring about contacts for subsequent cases has been acquired. This 
knowledge will hopefully facilitate the ensuing data collection in subsequent case studies and 
thus save time.    
 
 
Designing and presenting methods of analysis that combine the information value of both 
documents and interview data 
 
The triangulation of methods and data sources as it has been presented here seems to be a 
fruitful way forward but needs to be developed further. Some suggestions for re-analysing the 
material, e.g. with more sophisticated methods of textual analysis, have already been 
mentioned. However, it can be stated that textual analysis was able to explore areas of the 
research question (i.e. detailed content of reformists communication) that could not be 
explored by interviews. Interviews, in turn, yielded some hints as to the reception of 
reformists’ communication efforts (which is impossible to infer from documents alone).  
 
Illustrating the (implicit causal mechanism at work) effects of IL (i.e. deliver arguments for a 
link between indications for IL and path-breaking reforms): 
 
Last but not least, the goal of exploring the causal mechanisms behind IL has not yet been 
sufficiently addressed by the analysis in this paper. Yet, by inquiring about the use of different 
strategies in the interviews, a start has been made, indicating that in the present case IL has 
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not been the only factor in achieving the adoption of the reform. This question clearly needs 
to be addressed again in subsequent drafts of the paper.    
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Appendix 
 
 
1.  A preliminary operationalization of ideational leadership (IL)  
 
a.) In terms of analysing textual data from documents 
The following analytical categories have been defined within the dimensions listed in illustration 1 
(Section 2) 
1) ‘Exposing drawbacks of old policy principles and institutions based on them’  
This implies to search texts for lines of argument that carry one of the two following indicators:   
 Indicate/identify problems with the status-quo of existing policies and institutions and/or 
underlying policy ideas and  
 Link these problems to policy failure, crisis, inefficiency, loss of welfare etc.   
An argument fitting this definition may read like the following: “Old policies (and/or the principles 
upon which they rest) are no longer viable/no long work/no longer effective/etc. because of…”  
Here, we are interested in whether such arguments are used at all and if so, how frequently 
policy failure is evoked.  A negative instance in this category (instance of non-occurrence) would exist 
if we found in the text  
 Calls for reform that are legitimised without reference to the status quo 
 ‘Old system must be preserved’ arguments 
 
2) ‘Consistently legitimising new policy principles, with support of policy entrepreneurs’  
This category implies searching text for lines of arguments that  
 Link suggested policy solutions and/or new policy principles, to before mentioned problems 
(cognitive dimension), for instance “this measure will address the problem of….” 
 Argue how they link to norms/values present in society (normative dimension), for instance 
“this measure is in congruence with our understanding of social justice” 
 Refer to the ‘authority’ of policy entrepreneurs (usually outside experts) who act as suppliers 
and ‘legitimises’ of innovative ideas  
 
Here, we are also interested in whether such arguments are typically used together (i.e. in close 
proximity in the text) and whether key policy-makers are consistent in using them (over time). The 
former may be assessed while scanning text for arguments by recording instances of close re-
occurrence, while assessing the latter depends on whether texts suitable for analysis can be found have 
also been written at sufficiently different points in time during a reform process. A non-occurrence of 
this second category can be stated when  
 The link between problems – solutions is not being made explicit 
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 Values/policy principles are not being referred to when discussing proposals  
 Outside experts are not being referred to  
 
3) ‘Frame reform resistance as problematic for a) societal welfare, and b) for interest groups   
The third dimension corresponds to category 3 and implies searching for arguments that   
 Expose reform opponents’ behaviour as being ‘irresponsible’ concerning the ‘common 
interest’, ‘society as a whole’ etc, e.g. “blocking this law is contrary to pursuing the common 
interest”, “such a position is socially irresponsible” 
 Confront reform opponents verbally with consequences of non-cooperation for their 
(constituents) interests, e.g. “blocking the reform is against the interest of employees’ 
 
We are interested in whether such arguments appear in the texts at all or whether reformists use 
other rhetorical means to refer to the resistance they encounter. Correspondingly, we can speak of a 
negative instance for 3) when reformists were not to make an issue out of or even stigmatise blocking 
behaviour, neither for the sake of a ‘common interest’ nor for the interests of a interest group 
constituency.   
The remaining dimension 4) ‘Anticipate bureaucratic bottlenecks’ is difficult to translate into a 
category in the analysis of texts because of lack of suitable indicators. It is believed that timely 
communication of new policy principles between key policy-makers (executive) and the bureaucracy 
cannot be learned from the kind of communicative texts that will be the object of analysis. It remains 
to be seen whether suitable information can be gained from interviews and the interview material will 
be looked at with category 4 in mind. A negative instance of 4) may be given when a reform proposal 
appears to be produced in an  ‘ad hoc’ manner and/or conflicts between ministers/cabinet and ministry 
have spilled over in the public sphere.  
 
b.) In terms of analysing interview data
In contrast to the analysis performed on texts, the analysis performed on interview protocols did 
not rely on operationalizing IL in terms of its dimensions. The goal of the interviews was not to ask 
experts detailed questions on whether key politicians used particular arguments in presenting and 
defending the reform which is problematic due to the elapsed time. Rather, the focus of the interviews 
was to collect substantive information about the whole of the reform process rather than ‘just’ 
assessing the aspect of leadership within the reformist political camp. This of course includes 
leadership, but also covers other aspects of the process including actors, (the perception of) their 
strategies and the quality/the development of the process, which cannot be captured as easily by a 
single text of even a combination of texts. In order to view and analyse interview data in a systematic 
manner, making accounts comparable, an analytic grid based on the interview schedule (see appendix) 
was used to capture the answers based on the interviewee-approved protocols.  
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2.  List of documents used in textual analysis  
 
Interviews 
 
‘Wir tricksen nicht’, Interview mit Arbeitsminister Walter Riester, Der Spiegel 46/2000, p.25-
26 
Interview mit Bundesarbeitsminister Walter Riester zur Rentenreform, DGB Magazin 
Einblick 23.10.00, www.einblick.dgb.de/archiv/0019/tx001901.htm 
‘Ich bin ja kein Masochist’, Interview mit Bundesarbeitsminister Walter Riester, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 25.1.2001, p. 27.  
 
Speeches 
 
‘Die Zukunft des Sozialstaats’, Rede von Walter Riester, Bundesminister f. Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung, 19.11.1999, source: Bundesministerium f. Gesundheit u. soziale Sicherung, 
www.bmgs.bund.de  
Deutscher Bundestag (2000). Plenarprotokoll 14/133. Berlin, Deutscher Bundestag (speech at 
first reading of the bill) 
Deutscher Bundestag (2001a). Plenarprotokoll 14/147. Berlin, Deutscher Bundestag (speech 
at second reading of the bill) 
Deutscher Bundesrat (2001) Plenarprotokoll 759. Berlin, Deutscher Bundesrat (answers of the 
minister to inquries of Länder deputies) 
Deutscher Bundestag (2001b). Plenarprotokoll 14/168. Berlin, Deutscher Bundestag (speech 
at final reading of the bill) 
 
Articles/opinion pieces 
 
Riester, Walter (2000a) Die Rentenversicherung an der Schwelle zum neuen Jahrtausend, 
Deutsche Rentenversicherung 1-2/2000, Frankfurt: VDR. 
Riester, Walter (2000b) Keine Problemlösung auf dem Rücken der jüngeren Generation, 
Frankfurter Rundschau 13.03.2000.  
Riester, Walter (2000c) Sicherheit für die Álteren – Bezahlbarkeit für die Jüngeren, Ifo-
Schnelldienst 28-29/2000. München: Ifo-Institut.  
Riester, Walter (2000d) Halbzeit, Reform-Zeit: Zeit der Ernte. Gewerkschaftliche 
Monatshefte 10/2000. Berlin: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
Riester, Walter (2001) Eine zukunftsfeste und bezahlbare Rente. Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 25.04.2001.  
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2. Summary Interview Protocols June 2004 
 
(Comparison of answers on main topics in the interview schedule: process, strategies, 
leadership, acceptance, aiding factors) 
 
 
 
Across: 
Title/position 
interviewee 
 
Below: 
Themes from  
Topic list interviews  
 
1) Policy expert on 
pension reform, 
formerly  
Max-Planck-Institute 
for the Study of 
Societies, Cologne  
 
2) Senior 
official, 
Ministry of 
Health and 
Social Order 
 
3) Employee 
parliamentary party 
group,  
Greens 
 
4) Member of 
parliament, 
CDU  
 
Overall 
perception/memories 
reform process 
‘chaotically 
organized’ 
‘old-age 
provision in 
Germany 
should become 
a mix of 
PAYGO and 
capital-
funding, met  
sceptically 
especially by  
trade unions’ 
‘Greens were 
prepared and open for 
a reform debate in 
contrast with the 
SPD’ 
‘very difficult 
process, also 
because of 
SPD-reversal 
of CDU 
pension reform 
1998’ 
Strategies of ref 
reformers – 1, 2, 35
1 (attempts to 
legitimise in public 
but failure to 
accommodate 
enemies in own 
party) 
2 (to trade 
unions/SPD-left) 
3 (futile attempt to 
cooperate with CDU) 
1 Initially too 
little (see 3rd 
strategy) 
2 Yes, 
especially on 
employers 
pension funds: 
crucial to gain 
acceptance for 
minimum 
pension levels  
3 No 
engagement 
with critique of 
‘traditionalists’ 
during the 
concept phase 
1 (attempts to 
persuade, but Riester 
too open for 
dialogue/suggestions) 
2 yes, especially on 
small details, but also 
on core points of 
reform: compensation 
factor  
3 get support of 
opposition to silence 
critics in SPD   
1 (next to 
Riester, 
Schroeder 
involved as 
well as 
financial 
industry) 
2 (how real 
were 
concessions 
made? 
Remarkable 
concessions 
due to massive 
lobbying by 
trade unions) 
3 not relevant 
(possibly 
within SPD), 
CDU had 
agreed on 
many reform 
point in 1998 
already 
 
                                                 
5 Legend strategies. 1: communicative (legitimising the need for and rationale of reform), 2: making concessions 
in exchange for acceptance/acquiescence, 3: ignoring/outmanoeuvring reform opponents 
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Political leadership 
Riester 
 
Communication yes, 
but effects on 
opponents?  
 
Minister 
showed 
stamina, being 
a newcomer to 
the political 
arena, yet 
achieved 
paradigmatic 
change in the 
face of huge 
resistance 
(aided by 
chancellor’s 
backing and 
parliamentary 
groups as well 
as some trade 
unions 
 
Yes, but sometimes 
lacked sensibility for 
processes and actors, 
sometimes too 
sensitive to 
suggestions  
 
Yes, minister 
had a solid 
way of 
working, 
knowledgeable 
about details, 
trying to build 
bridges 
Why eventual 
acceptance 
proposal? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mostly concessions  All actors 
realized that 
the risk of a 
total systemic 
change was 
avoided: 
compromise 
seen as able to 
regain 
confidence in 
first pillar 
NA6 (due to time 
constraints)  
Acceptance 
understood as 
by the public: 
economic 
situation and 
visibility of 
Herzog/Ruerup 
Comm. has 
helped  
Other helpful factors  Green party, 
lobbying of banks 
and insurance 
industry, boom on 
the stock exchanges 
Germany’s 
‘backward’ 
position in 
international 
comparison,  
Pressure of 
financial 
industry, 
reform 
demands 
advanced by   
scientists  
Public discourse on 
pension policy has 
changed from a 
discussion among 
experts to a societal 
discussion on the 
future of pensions, 
demography, 
New Economy boom 
helped fostering a 
discussion about 
private pension 
provision   
Tendency in 
media to report 
in favour of 
need for 
reforms due to 
generational 
change, change 
of thinking in 
the public at 
large    
Important but not 
asked 
Influential role of 
VDR in maintaining 
status-quo 
Government 
promotion 
scheme of 
private 
pensions was 
hampered by 
lack of Länder 
cooperation.   
NA  No 
 
 
                                                 
6 NA= question was not asked 
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Across:  
Title/position 
interviewee 
 
Below: 
 
Topics  
Interview 
Schedule  
 
5) Former employee 
responsible for pension 
policy, parliamentary 
group, SPD 
 
6) Member of 
parliamentary 
social affairs 
committee,   
SPD   
 
7) Former trade 
union federation 
official  
(responsible for 
contribution-
based pension 
provision)  
 
 
8) Trade 
union 
federation 
official, 
head of 
section 
labour and 
social 
security 
law  
 
9) Former 
member of 
parliament, 
speaker for 
health and 
pension policy,  
Greens (by 
email)  
Overall 
perception/ 
memories 
reform process 
‘Split between 
ministry and coalition 
working group lead to 
misunderstandings 
from an early stage’  
‘group of SPD 
opponents and 
trade union 
officials – 
underestimated 
by the minister 
himself - 
achieved 
influential 
changes’ 
‘Difficult stance 
to maintain high 
pension 
provision in the 
first pillar” 
‘normal 
process of 
political 
opinion-
forming’ 
within the 
reformists 
proposal, 
first 
attempt at 
integration 
of two very 
much 
opposed 
systems 
‘historic 
reform, 
paradigmatic 
change’ 
Strategies of 
reformers  
1, 2, 37
1 (insufficient 
communication 
between ministry and 
parliamentary group 
SPD – legitimisation 
by ‘TINA’, choice for 
prior development 
concept and going 
public quite late) 
2 especially to trade 
unions/social welfare 
associations 
3 typical for 1999-
2000, first ‘consensus’ 
talks with CDU then 
looking for other 
supporters 
1 Yes, in the 
parliamentary 
group, but no 
accompanied by 
early 
concessions 
2 Yes, but in the 
later phase only 
when damage to 
the minister 
resulted, also in 
the absence of 
the minister 
3 Critics were 
avoided (which 
backfired!) but 
not ignored 
1 Reformists 
tried to 
convince with 
arithmetic 
stunts/yield and 
arguments about 
deteriorating 
economy 
2 Yes 
3 No, reformist 
did engage with 
critics 
1  No, 
‘TINA’ 
strategy, 
little 
discussion 
about the 
‘if’ of 
proposed 
reforms, 
persuasion 
about 
questions 
of details 
2 Yes, e.g. 
ceiling on 
minimum 
pension 
level 
3 Points of 
critique, 
alternative 
proposals  
1 (persuasion 
work towards 
associations 
and interest 
groups) 
2 concessions 
made to trade 
unions 
3 not 
mentioned 
Political 
leadership 
Riester 
Not really.  
Little sensitive to 
outside influences, 
Yes, in general 
communicating 
and persuasion 
No strong 
leadership style 
due to many 
Showed 
consistency 
in arguing 
‘Minister also 
contributed to 
success’, 
                                                 
7 Legend strategies. 1: communicative (legitimising the need for and rationale of reform), 2: making concessions 
in exchange for acceptance/acquiescence, 3: ignoring/outmanoeuvring reform opponents 
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limited number of 
advisors, took little 
care of support-
building within the 
party 
work, but bad 
process 
management:  
Misinterpretation 
of power 
relations and 
communicative 
mistakes (visit to 
Australia!) 
  
amendments 
made to original 
proposals 
(proposals 
contrary to own 
beliefs/problems 
to get message 
across) 
for 
proposal, 
possibly 
strongly 
convinced 
of necessity 
despite 
communicative 
deficits (many 
single 
suggestions, 
some key 
concessions) 
Why increase in 
acceptance 
proposal? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reform ‘tiredness’, 
concessions over time 
Through (late) 
integration of the 
critique 
opponents 
(understood as 
acceptance by 
the public) 
‘decrease of 
opposition 
meant no 
increase in 
acceptance, 
rather 
resignation to 
the facts’ 
Resignation 
at some 
point: 
accepting 
without real 
acceptance, 
serious 
doubts 
about 
durability 
of reform  
NA 
Other helpful 
factors  
Increase of subsidies 
for private pension 
plans, new economy 
boom 
Long-going 
debate on 
demographic 
change, tendency 
towards 
privatisation, 
New Economy 
boom 
High social 
contribution 
rates (also 
exposed by 
annual strategy 
reports for 
EU/OMC, boom 
on the stock 
markets, 
globalisation 
arguments  
Not known unknown 
Important but 
not asked 
Internal dynamics of 
governing coalition: 
Greens agreeing with 
oppositions on some 
strategic points: 
complicated later state 
negotiations 
NA No  Doubts 
were 
confirmed 
by advice 
of Rürup 
commission 
after 2002: 
more 
reforms in 
first pillar 
NA 
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